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HEURISTICS TO IMPROVE HUMAN FACTORS PERFORMANCE IN AVIATION
William A. Tuccio

Abstract
This paper reviews literature related to heuristic cognitive strategies as they are used by flight crews. A review of
heuristic and naturalistic cognition is presented. An example set of heuristics and cognitive biases are presented and
where possible exemplified by 19 airline accidents. The paper suggests two tentative research designs which could
be pursued to quantitatively study heuristics and its impact on aviation decision making. The paper concludes that
aviation pilot training would benefit by introducing pilots to the concepts and constructs of heuristic thinking.

This paper reviews the literature related to a variety of
cognitive strategies under the broad umbrella of heuristics
and biases. Where possible, the heuristics are demonstrated
against 19 example airline accidents. Following the
cognitive introduction, an inventory of heuristics is
presented aimed at demonstrating that time limited decision
making is defined by heuristic cognitive strategies. A
research model is suggested to quantitatively study
heuristics in aviation. The paper concludes that aviation
pilot training would benefit by introducing pilots to the
concepts and constructs of heuristic thinking.
Human Factors and Heuristics Background
In their book, The Limits ofExpertise, Dismukes, Berman,
and Loukopoulos analyze 19 airline accidents occurring
over a near ten year period. While the authors draw out
many themes and proximate causes of the accidents, Table
1 (see Appendix) summarizes the cognitive aspects of each
accident. The cognitive aspects often point out faults in
human decision making, such as plan continuation bias, the
anchoring heuristic and availability heuristic (Dismukes,
Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007). Throughout this paper,
reference will be made to Table 1 as examples of cognitive
constructs.
Heuristic thought processes fall under the broader
topic of naturalistic decision making and bounded
rationality. The term heuristic is an often misunderstood
term. In the popular mathematics book, How to Solve It,
P6lya introduces heuristic as,
Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as
final and strict but as provisional and plausible
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only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of
the present problem ... We shall attain complete
certainty when we shall have obtained the
complete solution, but before obtaining certainty
we must often be satisfied with a more or less
plausible guess. We may need the provisional
before we attain the final. We need heuristic
reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we
need scaffolding when we erect a building. (P6lya,
1985, p. 113)
P6lya is pointing out that many aspects of problem
solving may end up in a state of complete certainty, but
problems often require thinking which is sufficient for the
problem at hand. Heuristic reasoning may therefore either be
a means or an end in problem solving: for probabilistic
solutions, heuristics can be an end, while for problems
requiring certainty, heuristics may be a means to an end.
P6lya' s heuristics view supports and complements the views
of Nobel Prize economist Herbert A. Simon who posited a
view of problem solving known as satisficing. Simon
suggests real-world solutions by organisms and economics
are often practically defined not by rationality or even
probabilistic, recursive optimization, instead by a solution
which is sufficient for the problem at hand,
Since the organism, like those of the real world,
has neither the senses nor the wits to discover an
'optimal path'---even assuming the concept of
optimal to be clearly defined-we are concerned
only with finding a choice mechanism that will
lead it to pursue a 'satisficing' path, a path that will
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solution is to use Bayesian methods, which use statistical
methods ofprobability to define an optimum solution named
after the 18th century mathematician (International society
for Bayesian analysis (ISBA), 2010). However, it is often
the case resources do not exist to find a solution of complete
certainty, furthermore, the environment in which one
operates does not permit a solution of certainty. The
environment may be sufficiently constrained to support a
limited number of outcomes discoverable with heuristic
thinking: A bounded solution-what Gigerenzer and Todd
call ecological rationality and Simon calls satisficing.

permit satisfaction at some specified level of all of
its needs. (Simon, 1956, p. 136)
Simon advances P6lya's heuristic concepts into a
framework where problem solving is defined holistically by
considering both the person making the decision and the
environment where the decision is made. Gigerenzer and
Todd build upon Simon, and contrast the views of
unbounded rationality and ecological rationality (1999). As
shown in Figure 1, unbounded rationality, characterized by
Gigerenzer and Todd as "Demons", assumes a complete,
logical solution exists and resources are available to find
such a solution, or as P6lya says, a solution of complete
certainty. One common measure of an ideal, probabilistic

Visions of Reality
I

I

I

Bounded Rationality

Demons

I

I

I

Unbounded
Rationality

I

Optimizations
Under
Constraints

I

Satisficing

I

Fast and
Fn1gal
Heurisitcs

Figure I. Visions ofreality, adapted from "Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox," by G. Gigerenzer and P. M.
Todd, 1999, Simple Heuristics Which Make Us Smart,p. 4. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.
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A common theme of the accidents shown in Table
1 is that, while preventable, the accidents did not point to
deficiency or negligence by an individual, rather to a failure
of the aviation system. As the ICAO Safety Management
Manual (SMM) points out, the safety adage that 70% of all
accidents are caused by human error is a flawed perspective,
"Simply put: humans design, manufacture, train, operate,
manage and defend the system. Therefore, when the system
breaks down, it is of necessity due to human error. From this
perspective and depending upon the level of observation,
one hundred per cent of accidents are arguably caused by
human error'' (International Civil Aviation Organization
[ICAO], 2009, p. 7-14).
Jn the language of Safety Management Systems
(SMS), the accidents of Table 1 had a certain chance of
occurrence, given the probabilistic nature of the
environment intersected with human decision making as
opposed to a deterministic endeavor (Dismukes et al., 2007).
Spoken in a different vernacular, in Fate is the Hunter,
Gann says,
And sometimes they [accident investigators]
discover a truth which they can explain in the hard,
clear terms of mechanical science. They must
never, regardless of their discoveries, write off a
crash as simply a case of bad luck. They must
never, for fear of ridicule, admit other than to
themselves, which they all do, that some totally
unrecognizable genie has once again unbuttoned
his pants and urinated on the pillar of science.
(Gann, 1961, p. 9)
The end result is the operational environment of
aviation is a resource constrained environment in variety of
dimensions, including time and information. Jn this
environment it is not always possible to attain a theoretically
certain solution and only something less is possible: a
plausible solution based on a bounded view of rationality.
Where Gigerenzer and Todd have the Demons of
unbounded rationality, Gann's genie is the resource
constrained, bounded rationality. The aim of this paper is to
transform the literary eloquence of Gann into a structured
heuristic based categorization of cognitive processes which
lead to human factor errors.
Heursitics, satisficing, ecological rationality and
bounded rationality are concepts which can aptly be defined
by Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). NDM is ''the
study of how people use their experience to make decisions
in field settings. We try to understand how people handle all
of the typical confusions and pressures of their
environments, such as missing information, time constraints,
vague goals and changing conditions" (Klein, 1999, p. 1).
JAAER, Spring 2011
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Klein points out NDM research funding started in the early
1980s by the U.S. Army and later by the U.S. Navy
following the shoot down of an Iranian airliner by the USS
Vincennes in 1988. Various researchers agree that the way
people make time pressured decisions is not via a process of
generating internal probabilities and comparing rational
option sets, rather, decision makers use categorization of
prior experience to solve new problems, often including
rapid mental simulation of outcomes. These mental
simulations are inferential based on past experiences and
training (Klein, 2008).
Gigerenzer and Todd's view of unbounded
rationality versus bounded rationality and Klein's
perspective on NDM are part of the FAA's Risk
Management Handbook. After pointing out the distinction
between analytical decision making as a method useful
when time is available, the handbook goes on to discuss
automatic and naturalistic decision making as a useful tool
in time critical situations. While the handbook mentions
NDM, it makes no direct mention of heuristics and has only
two references to the general topic ofbiases, which are often
a byproduct of heuristic thinking (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2009). If the cognitive processes of pilots
are in fact modeled by heuristics, then it is plausible to
suggest decision making education and training should
include a discussion of heuristics.
While cognitive issues discussed thus far offer a
possibility for increasing the performance of aviation
personnel, heuristic classification of cognitive issues may
offer another dimension to aviation safety reporting
programs, such as the Aviation Safety Reporting Program
(ASRS) or Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP).
Hendrickson notes in his doctoral thesis revolving around
ASRS data,
The lack of a standard classification scheme
available for sorting the numerous incident reports
submitted to ASRS has led to difficulties in
analyzing the incidents. There is great depth of
information available within these reports, and yet
it has remained largely untapped .... airlines are at
a loss as how to fully evaluate and analyze the
reports they are presented with. Although much
emphasis on incidents and accidents is placed on
what happened, a more important question is why
it happened. (Hendrickson, 2009, pp. 13-14)
If heuristic categories, cognitive biases and NDM
are in fact representative of human cognition in operational
settings, then these rules may point to a new dimension in
classification of error modes in accidents and incidents. The
Threat and Error Management Model (TEM) developed by
. Page41

3

Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 [2011], Art. 8

Heuristics Human Factors Aviation

the University of Texas was driven, in part, by a similar
desire to categorize ASAP human factors data into a
taxonomy based on an empirically derived model of flight
crew behavior. TEM categorizes flight crew actions into
threats, errors and undesired aircraft states. This ontology is
not only applied to ASAP report categorization, but is also
the basis of a training program to enhance flight crew
performance. Much of the success of TEM has been
attributed to it originating in a naturalistic setting, that of
Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) (Merritt & Klinect,
2006).
The LOSA approach used to develop TEM is
consistent with the Critical Incident Technique defined by
Flanagan in 1954. Flanagan described the technique as,
"The critical incident technique consists of a set of
procedures for collecting direct observations of human
behavior in such a way as to facilitate their potential
usefulness in solving practical problems and developing
broad psychological principles" (Flanagan, 1954, p. 1).
Flanagan credits the evolution of the technique to the pilot
selection process used by the Army Air Forces in the early
1940s during World War II. The critical incident technique
involves a systematic interview process with individuals
who performed a specific job function or engaged in a
critical . incident. The systematic method allows the
qualitative data of interviews to be transforriied into
quantitatively useful conclusions. Flanagan described
general application areas ofthe technique, including: " ... (a)
Measures of typical performance (criteria); (b) measures of
proficiency (standard samples); (c) training; (d) selection
and classification; (e) job design and purification; (t)
operating procedures; (g) equipment design; (h) motivation
and leadership (attitudes); [and] (i) counseling and
psychotherapy" (Flanagan, 1954, Uses of the Critical
Incident Technique section, para. 1). Flanagan cites
numerous successes of the technique including the
development of the Ethical Standards of Psychologists after·
the review of more than 1,000 critical incidents from this
field.
A report in 1974 by NASA attempted to categorize
human factors causes based on a detailed review of 74
accidents selected from a broader set of 200 accidents
investigated by the NTSB from 1958 to 1970. This analysis
used the computational abilities of 1974 in an attempt to
cluster human factors causes after researchers manually
identified factors in accidents and coded them against a
taxonomy developed for the study. The codes were
numerically assigned and grouped in an effort to detect
patterns. One conclusion reached by the 1974 report was,
"An over-all observation from the decision data leads us to
Page42
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recommend further research into the decision-making role
of the pilot. The present cockpit environment has been
shown to be less than ideal for a pilot to be a reliable
decision maker" (Kowalsky, Masters, Stone, Babcock, &
Rypka, 1974, p. 49).
Since the 1974 NASA report, numerous attempts
have been made at classification of human factors. In
addition to TEM model, there is the ASRS anomaly codes,
ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting System, Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and
Aviation Causal Contributors for Event Reporting System
(ACCERS) (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Each of
these models has strengths and weaknesses. Each is based
on human behavior and as such, touches upon cognitive
processes and biases. None of the models, however, are
heuristic centric.
The review of heuristics, cognitive biases, NDM
and classifications of human factors data leads to the
following possible hypothesis for further research: The
incorporation of vivid re-enactments of decision making
scenarios in training, categorized by heuristic features and
combined with training in heuristics, will improve the
decision making performance offlight crews in time-limited
scenarios compared to those crews not provided such
training.
In order to address the plausibility of research
supporting this hypothesis, a literature review of cognitive
processes and NDM follows.
Cognitive Literature Review
This section presents an inventory of cognitive
constructs drawn from heuristics and NDM. Where
applicable, the summary of 19 accidents in Table 1 are used
as a concrete example of the construct.
While many of the constructs are presented with
negative examples, each has some positive value. In fact, it
is the actual or perceived positive value which causes the
construct to persist as a decision making technique, either
overtly or unknowingly.
Checklists and Mnemonics
Checklists are the simplest form of a heuristic as
they specify a procedure or rule (Bach & Bolton, 2007). A
checklist requires a context for usage and a skilled
practitioner for execution. Mnemonics are sometime used as
a memory aid for checklists. Incident 19, American 1420 is
an example of failed checklist usage.
Proverbs
P6lya recognizes the double edge nature of
proverbs in problem solving, "It would be foolish to regard
proverbs as an authoritative source of universally applicable
wisdom but it would be a pity to disregard the graphic
JAAER, Spring 2011
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description of heuristic procedures provided by proverbs"
(1985, p. 113). In aviation, there are numerous proverbs
which follow the guidance of P6lya. "Hours of boredom
with minutes of pure horror" imparts a warning about
complacency. "God-Slob" or "ego shutdown" represent
overbearing cockpit management styles leading to loss of
crew resource management effectiveness in the cockpit (J.R.
Cannon, personal communication June 20, 2010).
Analogy
Analogy is a common heuristic used to draw
inferences between similar events. Understanding analogy
is important as, " ... people often use vague, ambiguous,
incomplete, or incompletely clarified analogies" (P6lya,
1985, p. 41).
Analogy is a simple and often used heuristic. Like
other cognitive models, overt awareness of usage avoids
misuse and capitalizes on strengths, "It would be foolish to
regard the plausibility of such conjectures [analogy] as
certainty, but it would be just as foolish, or even more
foolish, to disregard such plausible conjectures" (P6lya,
1985, p. 43). Incident 7, Ryan 590 provides an example of
analogy of past experiences.
Auxiliary Elements
P6lya defines this heuristic as "An element that we
introduce in the hope that it will further the solution is an
auxiliary elemenf' (1985, p. 46). Flight training examples of
the addition of auxiliary elements include using a mental or
physical geometric overlay of the directional gyro to
visualize a holding pattern entry or traffic pattern entry.
Auxiliary elements may also include placing objects in key
places in the cockpit as a reminder aid, such as a laminated
checklist between throttles as a reminder of a cross feed
operation.
Decomposing and Recombining
Breaking a problem into smaller parts is a
fundamental act of problem solving. Simply put, a problem
is broken into parts and then recombined into a whole. The
challenge is, "Too many or too minute particulars are a
burden on the mind. They may prevent you from giving
sufficient attention to the main point, or even seeing the
main point at all" (P6lya, 1985, p. 76).
The 1972 Eastern Airlines flight 401 accident may
offer a telling portrayal of this heuristic. In this accident the
flight crew allowed the diagnosis of a landing gear indicator
light to lead to controlled flight into the terrain of the Florida
Everglades.
Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic is an easily understood
and often cited heuristic in cognitive biases. The heuristic is
defined as, "People using this heuristic judge an event as
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likely or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or
recall" (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982, p. 465). An
everyday example of this heuristic is the fear people
experience to go in the water after watching the movie Jaws.
In Table 1, incident number 15 involving American 903
suggests the crew discussion of convective activity led them
to improperly associate a stall with wind shear rather than a
stall caused by insufficient airspeed. The result was an
inappropriate selection of recovery technique based in part
on the availability heuristic.
The availability heuristic inhuman thought is based
upon how people use repetition as means to remember
information. The availability heuristic inverts the repetition
technique and uses the strength of association to judge
frequency of occurrence. While the availability heuristic is
a source of cognitive bias, it is also recognized as an
"ecologically valid clue for the judgment of frequency
because, in general, frequent events are easier to recall or
imagine then infrequent ones" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974,
p. 164).
Representativeness Heuristic
This heuristic is widely known in statistical circles
and is described as ''people believe samples to be very
similar to one another and to the population from which they
are drawn. We also suggested that people believe sampling
to be a self-correcting process" (Tversky & Kahneman,
1982, p. 25). An everyday example of this heuristic is the
gambler's fallacy of believing a sequence of bad luck will
be corrected or balanced by a sequence of good luck.
In flight operations, the representativeness heuristic
may be used by pilots to judge the acceptability of
continuing a flight operation in adverse conditions based on
a sampling of other aircraft successfully executing the same
operation. While this technique often works given the
ecological reality of flight operations, misuse of
representativeness in changing conditions may lead to
negative outcomes. Incident 1, USAir 1016 demonstrates
failure of the representative heuristic when a prior aircraft
reported a smooth ride yet flight 1016 experienced
windshear.
Adjustments from Anchor Heuristic
The adjustment from anchor heuristic is described
as "anchor on a specific cue or value and then adjust that
value to account for other elements of the circumstance.
Usually the adjustment is insufficient. So, once the anchor
is set, there is a bias toward that value" (Lehner, SeyedSolorforough, O'Connor, Sak, & Mullin, 1997, p. 699). In
aviation parlance, this is often known as get-there-itis and in
cognitive circles as plan continuation bias.
There are numerous examples in aviation of the
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anchoring heuristic. Table 1, incident 5, Southwest 1455
demonstrates a crew continuing an approach in the face of
numerous other inputs indicating abandonment of the
approach was the more suitable option.
Knowing with Certainty and Confirmation Bias
The consequence of the cognitive belief of
certainty is overconfidence and lack of questioning the
accuracy of the fact in question. Cognitive research has
shown a cause of unwarranted certainty is ''people's lack of
awareness that their knowledge is based on assumptions that
are often quite tenuous" (Slovic et al., 1982). While
certainty has been the debate of philosophers far beyond the
scope of this paper, in the context of flight operations,
Gigerenzer and Todd frame the issue concisely as,
" ... Nature is deterministic and certain; but for humans,
Nature is fickle and uncertain. Mortals cannot know the
world, but must rely on uncertain inferences, on bets rather
than on demonstrative proof' (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p.
8). Knowing with certainty in time pressured decision
environments inherently conflicts with the need to have
certain foundations upon which to act.
Related to certainty is the heuristic of confirmation
bias. Lehner describes this as "People tend to seek and focus
on confirming evidence, with the result that once they've
formed a judgment, they tend to ignore or devalue
disconfirming evidence" (Lehner et al., 1997, p. 699). Table
1, incident 9, the gear up landing of Continental 1943
demonstrates an example of confirmation bias.
Frequency Bias and Quick Estimation
Lehner defines this heuristic as "People often judge
the strength of predictive relations by focusing on the
absolute frequency of events rather than their observed
relative frequency. . . Information on the nonoccurrence of
an event is often unavailable and frequently ignored when
available" (1997, p. 699). Contrasting Lehner's view are
those ofHertwig, Hoffrage andMartignon, who demonstrate
an opposite view (citing Jonides and Jones), "'Ask about the
relative numbers ofmany kinds ofevents, and you are likely
to get answers that reflect the actual relative frequencies of
events with great fidelity"' (1999, p. 212).
The conflict between the two interpretations of
frequency bias points may be reconciled by an ecological
context, " ... what is the structure of the environments in
which quantification occurs, and what heuristics can exploit
that structure?" (Hertwig et al., 1999, p. 215). Hertwig et al.
point out while many frequency distributions have a normal
distribution or bell shaped curve, a large number of
frequency occurrences have a skewed normal distribution or
j-shaped curve, an example being the distribution of medals
won in the Olympic games in a given year by various
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countries.
One inference to be noted from the disagreement is
highly skewed populations are less likely to suffer from
frequency bias. A negative aspect is an omitted frequency is
likely to be ignored.
Concrete Information
The concrete information heuristic is framed as,
"Information that is vivid or based on experience or
incidents dominates abstract information, such as summaries
or statistical base-rates ... Concrete and vivid information
contributes to the imaginability [sic] of the information and,
in turn, enhances its impact on inference" (Lehner et al.,
1997, p. 699). In everyday terms, the greater the impact of
an experience, the more it is remembered.
The concrete information heuristic is used by Klein
in Sources ofPower in part to suggest how novices can be
trained to think like experts. Klein writes how expert stories,
" ... contain many lessons and are useful as a form of
vicarious experience for people who did not witness the
incident ... A good story is a package of different causal
relationships--what factors resulted in what effects ... a story
records an event that happened within a natural context"
(Klein, 1999, pp. 179-181 ). Stories, often expressed as
retrospectives, have the potential to impart concrete
information to those who did not directly experience an
event. This is not to say stories should replace procedural
knowledge, however, for the development of inferential
skills vivid, vicarious stories may hold tremendous value.
In the area of flight training, the methods available
to impart concrete information to students include flight
training, simulator training, reenactments, observation
flights and lecture-each with its own monetary cost, time
commitment and value. In speaking with David Zwegers,
Director of Flight Safety of Embry Riddle, the author
inquired about the frequency of the use of emotive
reenactments in the pilot training program. Mr. Zwegers
indicated reenactments were used occasionally, but not to a
great degree, and observation rides in simulators with other
students would be more common. He also noted EmbryRiddle would soon .be using Flight Operations Quality
Assurance (FOQA) data from training flights to replay flight
information (personal communication, June 14, 2010). The
author agrees with Klein when he says, "The method we
have found most powerful for eliciting knowledge is to use
stories" (Klein, 1999, p. 189). A demonstration comparing
an emotive and non-emotive way of imparting knowledge is
available at http://www.tuccio.com/dav712a. Additionally,
the AOPA Air Safety Foundation has a number of
instructional and emotive, interactive courses at
http://www.aopa.org/asf.
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Regression Towards the Mean
This heuristic of this behavior suggests people
misattribute cause and effect rather than recognizing
statistical normal distributions. That is,
... maximum performance is usually followed by
less than maximum performance (i.e., towards the
mean) and minimum performance is followed by
greater than minimum performance ... In a
discussion of flight training, experienced
instructors noted that praise for an exceptional
smooth landing is typically followed by a poorer
landing ... while harsh criticism after a rough
landing is usually followed by an improvement on
the next try. The instructors concluded that verbal
rewards are detrimental towards learning, while
verbal punishments are beneficial, contrary to
accepted psychological doctrine. (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127).
Awareness of regression towards the mean is similar to the
learning curve known as the learning plateau, where student
progress slows after a period of growth (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2008). However, there may be advantages
of expressing the human behavior from both perspectives,
as each allows insight into cognitive processes.
Recognition Heuristic
In its simplest form, the recognition heuristic is the
ability to recall something from memory as unknown,
familiar or well known. Recognition is then used to make
inferences about objects related to the recognized object. In
other words, an inaccessible thing to be measured is
measured by an accessible mediator (Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 1999). Absent human cognition, numerous
measurement instruments use mediators, in aviation altitude
and airspeed are measured by calibrations of pressure and
predictions of turbulence are based on rainfall intensity.
In certain domains of knowledge, when the object
to be measured has directional correlation to the mediator
which can be recognized, the recognition heuristic may offer
reliable benefits to the user, absent a more deterministic
method. An academic example is to ask subjects unfamiliar
with population sizes of cities to judge which cities are
larger based solely upon their recognition of the city name.
When this experiment has been attempted, not only did it
yield significant results, it actually showed subjects more
ignorant of the true population numbers scored better than
the informed group. This leads to Gigerenzer and Goldstein
to state a less-is-more heuristic "occurs when the
recognition validity is greater than the knowledge validity"
( 1999, p. 46). Misused, the less-is-more heuristic could yield
disastrous consequences in aviation; however, as a building
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block in a cognitive process, understanding the use of
accessible mediators to infer inaccessible things is a
valuable skill.
One broad example of the accessible pointing to
the inaccessible is go/no-go decision. This fundamental
safety decision in inaccessible and it is arrived at by looking
at directionally accessible indicators for the determination.
Minimalist, Take the Last, Take the Best Heuristics
Benjamin Franklin proposed what he called Moral
or Prudential Algebra, or Franklin's Rule as a method to
make decisions; In its simplest sense, the method involves
making a list of pros and cons, applying weights to each
factor, adding up the result and taking the higher result to
make a decision. An attempt to execute Franklin's Rule
considering all factors and using regression techniques may
result in problems challenging even to computers. Building
on the representative heuristic, Gigerenzer and Todd suggest
what is needed for time and resource limited decision
making is a stopping rule (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999).
A simple heuristic, the "Minimalisf' prescribes if
one feature is recognized and another is not, stop the search
for cues and use the recognized feature as the basis of
inference to make an inferential choice. If both features are
recognized, choose another cue and continue the process
until something is not recognized. A modified version of the
Minimalist approach is, "Take the Last" which tries to
positively use the Einstellung Effect. The Einstellung Effect
suggests people have a predisposition to solve a new
problem based on a prior success, even though the new
problem may not be best suited by the prior solution
method. In the Take the Last approach, the order of cue
selection is based on a prior success of cue selection. A
modification of Take the Last is "Take the Best", whereby
one orders the cues selected based on their highest inference
validity to solving the problem. The order of selection is
based either on intuition or institutional learning (Gigerenzer
& Goldstein, 1999).
While these heuristics may seem trivial in their
presentation, in the opinion of the author, this type of
heuristic is used in practice for the deviation around
thunderstorms based on weather radar interpretation. The
weather radar interpreter looks for recognized features, takes
the best match of prior familiarity, and uses that as the basis
ofinference for best path selection. Thunderstorm deviation
is often a satisficing solution process.
Classical Decision Making (Non-Heuristic Alternative)
In a classical decision making model, the rational
choice method includes: Consider a wide range of options;
consider various objectives; weigh costs, risks, benefits of
each option; search for new information in evaluating
Page45
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options; assimilate all new information; consider the
positive and negative consequences and risks; and plan for
alternatives if the risks occur. Klein points out in timepressured situations, some flaws with this plan include,
" ... you do not have all the data you need, or are not sure
how to do the ratings, or disagree with the weights, or run
out of time before you have finished" (Klein, 2008, pp. 2829).
Klein continues to point out in many scenarios the
rational choice method is appropriate. However, in a time or
resource constrained domain, the rational choice method
ollly serves as a model, not how people really think in timepressured, resource constrained scenarios.
Recognition-Primed Decision Model
In response to a request in 1984 by the Army to
study how people make decisions under time pressure, Gary
Klein defined the Recognition-Primed Decision Model

0
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..!)-

~
Yes

Inference
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(Oarify]

0
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{7

more data

Recognition Bv-Produds

Variation 3: Evaluate Course of Action

Variation 2: Diagnose Situation

Variation 1: Simple Match
@perience Situation in Changing Context ]

(RPD). After living with firefighters and extensive
interviews, Klein came up with the RPD model shown in
Figure 2. Klein's RPD identifies three models of time
pressured decision making all starting with recognition of a
typical situation. In Variation 1 of the RPD, the typicality is
obvious to the decision maker based on expert experience
and intuition allowing a set of expectations, goals, cues and
typical actions to be recalled and set in motion. Variation 2
of the RPD recognizes the need to diagnose the situation to
determine a typical situation, and then compare expectancies
of the prototype to the actual occurrence and adapt
accordingly. Variation 3 introduces deviations from
typicality and how actions must be modified to suit the
novel situation using mental simulation, again based on
experience (Klein, 1999).

Recognition Bv-Produc.ts

[Expectancies) (Relevant]
Cues
Plausible
Goals

Implement
Course of Action

Figure 2. Recognition Primed Decision Model (RPD). Adapted from Sources ofPower: How People Make Decisions, by G.
Klein, 1999, p.25.
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The RPD model is an outgrowth of the satisficing
concepts ofeconomist Herbert Simon, previously discussed,
whereby tbe solution found is the first workable solution
rather than the optimum solution. The RPD model is one
expression of NDM and Klein reports it models 80-9()%, of
time pressured decision making {Klein, 2008). Figure 3
shows a comparison made by the FAA bL'tWeen a non4ime
constrained approach to decision making and the NDM/RPD
model advocated by Klein.
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flgure 3. Comparison of convential, mm-time constrained, analytical
time-constrained,
decision
decision
making and
making. From F'.4A Risk Management Handbook. by tbe Federal Aviation Administration, 2009, p. 5-5.
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The RPD model is not purported to be fool proof,
only a realistic model of cognition in time pressured
decision making. fu Table 1, incident 2, the response of
TWA 843 can be modeled in part after the RPD model
leading to an erroneous and negative outcome.
Research Design
The literature review presented leads to the
following for a research design: The incorporation of vivid
re-enactments of decision making scenarios in training,
categorized by heuristic features and combined with training
in heuristics, will improve the decision making performance
of flight crews in time-limited scenarios compared to those
crews not provided such training.
The elements necessary to investigate the
hypothesis includes: (a) An inventory of heuristics and
decision making features; (b) a collection of vivid, reenactments of decision making scenarios set in a natural,
pilot environment organized by heuristic; ( c) a training
syllabus using the heuristic taxonomy and re-enactments; ( d)
a sufficiently large group of pilots of varied experiences to
participate in the training; and (e) generic, yet realistic, pilot
performance exercises to test the trained and control groups
to measure differences. Each of these elements is discussed
in turn.
Heuristic Inventory
An inventory, building upon the ones presented in
this paper, will be the basis of a training syllabus and as an
organizational method for the vivid re-enactments. Each
heuristic will consist of a cognitive explanation, practical
examples, negative and positive aspects and quiz questions
to verify student understanding.
Vivid Re-Enactments
As discussed in the section, Concrete Information,
and central to the hypothesis, vivid re-enactments are
believed to be a key part of inferential decision making. A
collection of vivid re-enactments, likely taken from
simulator sessions, or other means, will be created and
targeted at each heuristic. The re-enactment will incorporate
sound, realism of flight scenarios and parameters both from
a cockpit and external perspective, along with human
emotion designed to elicit emotive responses from the
student.
Training Syllabus
A training syllabus will be developed to effectively
administer the heuristic and re-enactment information. The
training syllabus will incorporate standard elements of
training, including diagnostic quizzes.
Subject Pilots
A statistically representative group of pilots of
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varied experiences will be selected to participate in training.
Two groups will exist, one which will receive the outlined
training, another which will not.
Pilot Performance Exercises
The pilots who receive the training will be
subjected to in-flight decision making, typical of aviation
scenarios where there is limited time and incomplete
information. Both the control group and the pilots who
received the training will be subjected to the same exercises.
Data Analysis
After the training and exercises, the collected
information will be statistically analyzed. The information
analyzed will be the pilot performance exercises as well as
surveys of the trained pilots and their impressions of the
value of the training.
Alternative Research Design
The outlined research design is likely a resource
intensive undertaking. An alternative design to discover
support of interest in heuristics and NDM could be done
using a survey. Questions designed to gauge present
population understanding of heuristics would not only
support the hypothesis but also help refine the full research
design.
Conclusions
Heuristics persist as a cognitive strategy because
they often work. The recognition heuristic describes the use
of an accessible mediator to measure an inaccessible item.
The recognition heuristic can be easily understood through
a building block description first of how an altimeter
measures altitude by way of pressure, then one can explain
how the go/no-go decision uses similar accessible
measurements to make the inaccessible decision. However,
it is language and concepts that permit the encapsulation of
examples into abstract constructs. Heuristics and its
associated constructs are the language necessary to fully
describe a key aspect of human cognition in the operational
environment ofaviation-an environment often fraught with
incomplete information and time critical decisions.
Mathematics Magazine from 1987 described
·P6lya's 1944 heuristic based approach to problem solving,
How To Solve It! in this way, "For mathematics education
and the world of problem solving it marked a line· of
demarcation between two eras, problem solving before and
after P6lya" (P6lya, 1985, p. xix). If in fact heuristics plays
such an important part in problem solving and human bias,
then the author believes it a failing of pilot training that a
significant part of the pilot community is not overtly
educated in this form of cognition.+
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Appendix
Table l

Summary ofAircraft Accidents and Cognitive Analysis
ID
1

Flight/Year
USAir 1016, 1994

Encounter
Windshear

2

TWA 843, 1992

Erroneous Stick
Shaker

3

AA 1572,
1995

Descent Below
MDA

4

American
International 808,
1993

Missing Visual
Cue

5

Southwest 1455,
2000

Unstabilized
Approach

6

FedEx 14,
1997

7

Ryan 590,
1991

8

Tower41,
1995

Pilot Induced
Oscillations
("PIO") During
Landing
Wing
Contamination on
Takeoff
Loss of Control
on Takeoff Roll

9

Continental 1943,
1996

Gear Up Landing

10

AA 102,
1993

Runway
Excursion After
Landing

Page 52

https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol20/iss3/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2011.1640

Cognitive Observations
"Characteristic human cognitive tendencies under high workload,
time pressure and stress ... and retrieval of declarative knowledge .. .is
impaired." (p. 22)
"Rapid decisions by experts are often driven by automatic retrieval
from memory of scenarios from past experiences ... to match the current
situation (described as 'recognition-primed decision making')." (p. 32)
"[the flying pilot] may have been unwittingly depending on the first
officer's [non-flying pilot] callouts his cue to take action ... Wiener and
Curry describe examples of this phenomenon in aviation operations,
referring to it as ''primary-backup inversion", in which a backup cue
such as an altitude alert becomes the primary signal to which the pilot
responds." (p. 44)
" ... pilots, like all individuals, are vulnerable to plan continuation
bias, which makes them slow to recognize that an original or habitual
plan of action is no longer appropriate to the situation and must be
revised." (p. 59)
" ... cognitive factors probably make all individuals vulnerable to
some degree of plan continuation errors. Among those factors are
overconfidence bias, a tendency to overestimate one's own knowledge;
confirmation bias, a tendency to seek and notice only those cues that
confirm a currently held belief or plan ... ; and the anchoring heuristic,
which weighs cues supporting the current plan more heavily than
conflicting cues when plans are revised." (p. 78)
" ... quickly retrieving and executing declarative knowledge in the
midst of a PIO is at best difficult. In contrast to highly practiced
procedural knowledge, retrieval of infrequently used declarative
knowledge from memory is often slow and effortful." (p. 90)
"Individual experiences may not cover the full range of possibilities
and thus may lead to incomplete and sometimes misleading mental
models of prototypical situations." (p. 97)
"This accident illustrates the unanticipated ways in which habits that
seem harmless or even advantageous in routine situations pose a latent
threat that may cause harm when circumstances combine in just the
wrong way." (p. 107) (described as ''practical-drift" (p. 104))
"In general, when confronted with a problem, individuals are prone
to settle on an explanation that seems consistent with their previous
experience (described as 'recognition primed decision-making by Klein,
1997) ... The phenomenon, called confirmation bias, has been observed
in diverse settings ... " (p.122)
" ... under time pressure, surprise, workload, or stress individuals are
often unable to retrieve quickly from memory all information relative to
the situation, especially if that information is not elaborated or is not
used frequently. Among the distinctions cognitive psychologists make
about the ways in which information is organized and stored in memory
is a distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge." (p.
138
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Cognitive Observations
" ... limitations in human memory can lead individuals to confuse
memory of performing a task many times previously or memory of
having recently thought about performing the task with actually having
performed the task currently." (p. 154)
Stall
on
Take-Off
"This accident and others discussed in this book illustrate the
12 USAir405,
difficulty expert decision-makers sometimes have in recognizing
1992
whether past experience and knowledge are adequate to evaluate the
current situation." (p. 163)
Landing Short of
"Experts operate largely by recognizing familiar situations and
13 Valujet 558,
Runway
1996
automatically retrieving directly relevant information from memory."
. 180
Disorientation,
"Individuals suddenly confronted with a totally unexpected anomaly
14 Air Transport
Loss of Control
International 805,
with which they have no experience typically require at least a few
1992
in IMC
seconds to recognize and evaluate the situation and decide on an
appropriate response, and even longer if the anomaly is subtle." (p. 191)
"This discussion [about thunderstorms in the vicinity of the flight
Loss of Control at
15 American 903,
Altitude
1997
path] would have primed them [flight crew] to think about possible
consequences of the weather, such as windshear, and would have
facilitated retrieval from memory of windshear recovery techniques
(described as 'availability heuristic). Research on human memory has
shown that the way individuals conceptually frame their current
situation substantially biases what information is retrieved from
memory and how that information is interpreted." (pp. 205-206)
16 Simmons 3641,
"Automatization can make us vulnerable to errors in which we
Application of
Propeller Beta in
automatically execute a response to a situation that resembles - but only
1994
superficially- other situations in which the response is appropriate." (p.
Flight
220
"Considering the inherent limitations of human reaction time to
Cat II ILS
17 AA 1340,
Autopilot
unexpected events that require recognition, analysis, and response
1998
Deviation
selection, the rapidity of the large pitch-down at the moment the captain
was transitioning to outside visual references ... " (p. 228)
Landing Short of
"Plan continuation bias and the difficulty of quickly and correctly
18 Delta 554,
1996.
Runway
assessing whether attempts to salvage an approach will work should be
emphasized ... " (p. 243)
''Under high workload and stress, individuals attempt to simplify
19 American 1420,
Destabilized
Approach and
their tasks and reduce mental demands. We suspect that one way pilots
1999
Runway
unwittingly simplify task demands in these challenging situations is to
Excursion
shift from a proactive stance to a more reactive stance, responding to
each event as it occurs, rather than managing the overall situation
strategically." (p. 252)
Note: This table is not meant to imply one factor caused each accident. The intent of this table is to draw out only the
cognitive aspects of each accident for the purpose discussing cognitive issues in a broader context. Page numbers of citations
refer to the original source. Adapted from Dismukes, R. K., Berman, B. A., Loukopoulos, L. D., 2007, The Limits of
Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Cause ofAirline Accidents, Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, VT.
ID
11

Flight/Year
Continental 795,
1994
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Encounter
Aborted Take-Off
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